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SYLLABUS.
A constitutional provision, which requires the senate districts to contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of inhabitants, and that the
members of the assembly be apportioned among the several counties, as
nearly as may be, according to the number of their respective inhabitantsnecessarily vests a discretion in the legislature in making the apportionment, and it will not be interfered with by the courts unless it is
plainly and grossly abused.
In deciding whether or not the legislature has abused its discretion,
the Court will consider all the circumstances which make it difficult to
agree on an apportionment, such as local pride, commercial jealousy and
rivalry, diverse interests, misapprehension of the real interests of different localities, and other conditions which might make a compromise
necessary in order to accomplish any result.
The mere fact that in apportioning the members of the assembly the
legislature, after giving to each county the full number to which its population entitles it, do not apportion the extra members to those counties
having the largest surplus over the ratio of representation, but award
them in some instances to those having a less surplus, does not show such
an abuse of legislative discretion as will warrant the Court to declare the
act invalid; at least when there is nothing to show that the legislature
was influenced by improper considerations, and when the next United
States census shows an increased population in those counties.
In determining whether an Apportionment Act is unconstitutional,
because of inequalities between population and representation, the Court
may consider the results which may follow a decision against the Act,
such as the fact that any Apportionment Act may be brought before the
Court for review, that greater inequalities exist in the next preceding Apportionment Act, which is yet more at variance with the Constitution
than the one under discussion, and that if both these are declared unconstitutional the only remaining Apportionment Act would be one over a
quarter of a century old, and therefore unfit to apply to present conditions of population.
IReported in 31 N. E. Rep.,

921.

Decided in October, 1892.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The New York Constitution (Art. 3, Sec: 4) provides
that "an enumeration of the inhabitants of the State shall
be taken under the direction of the Legislature in the year
1855, and at the end of every ten yearq thereafter; and the
said districts shall be so altered by the Legislature at the
first session after the return of every enumeration that each
senate district shall contain, as nearly as may be, an equal
number of iphabitants, excluding aliens and persons of
color not taxed; and shall remain unaltered until the return
of another enumeration, and shall at all times consist of
contiguous territory; and no county shall be divided in the
formation of a senate district, except such county shall be
equitably entitled'to two or more senators."
Section 5 of
the same article provides for 'i28 members of Assembly,
and then continues: "The members of Assembly shall be
apportioned among the several counties of the State by the
Legislature, as nearly as may be, according to the number
,of their respective inhabitants, excluding aliens, and shall
be chosen by single districts. . . . The Legislature,
at its first session after the return of every enumeration,
shall apportion the members of Assembly among the
several counties of the State, in manner aforesaid, etc."
The Apportionment Act of 1892 (Laws, 1892, C. 397)
exhibited some marked discrepancies in regard to the
senatorial districts. The proper ratio was i8o,899; but
one district contained a population of 241 , 138, and another
contiguous thereto only 105,720; yet both of these were in
the city of New York, where, if anywhere, equality of apportionment could have been reached. A number of other
districts also varied from the ratio by from 30,000 to 49,000.
In the apportionment of assemblymen among the various
counties there were also some notable discrepancies. Albany, with a population of 156,748, was given 4 members,
while Monroe, with 18x,230, was only allotted 3; and
Rennselaer, with 121,679, and Queens, with 123,974, were
each given the same number as Monroe. Duchess, with
75,078, was given two members, but St. Lawrence, with

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

8o,679, and Chautauqua, with 73,884, were each allotted
only one. These rather glaring discrepancies, however,
are explained by the fact that when the assemblymen were
apportioned among the' counties by the integral ratio of
population, there was a surplus of eleven not allotted, and
these, instead of being given in strict order to those counties having the largest surplus over the ratio, were apportioned arbitrarily. the four having the highest surplus,
however, received an extra member, and it would also
appear that the Act as originally reported followed the
strict mathematical method in apportioning the extra members to the counties having the highest surplus; but that
the variations thereafter made were due to necessary compromises during its passage.
The Board of Supervisors of Monroe County having
refused to district the county for the election of the three
members of Assembly allotted to it, alleging as a reason for
their refusal that the Act was unconstitutional, Charles F.
Pond, a citizen of the county, applied to the Special Term
of the Supreme Court for a writ of mandanmus to compel
the Board to district the county. This was denied in a
long and careful opinion by Ru-xsEv, J., on the ground that
the action of the supervisors was proper, because the Legislature had overstepped the limits of its discretion in making the apportionment,' and this decision was affirmed by
the General Term,2 MACOMBER, J., dissenting on the
ground that the errors were not serious enough to vitiate
the Act.
At about the same time the validity of the same Act
was called in question in Oneida County on an application
for a mandamus to the Secretary of State to compel him to
issue the statutory notices under the Apportionment Act of
1879; but the application was denied on the ground that
the Court had no power to interfere with the discretion of
the Legislature, as expressed in the Act of 1892. '
'Peo. ex rel. Pond z'. Board of Supervisors of Monroe County, 19 N.
Y. Suppl., 978.
2
Id. v. Id., 2o N. Y. Suppl., 97.
Rice, Secretary of State, 20 N. Y. SuppL, 293.
:Peo. ex rel. Carter v.'
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Both cases were taken to the Court of Appeals, and
judgment was there rendered in accordance with the syllabus previously given, affirming Peo. v. Rice, though on
different grounds from those taken by the Supreme Court,
and reversing Peo. v. Board of Supervisors.
GERRYMANDERING.

This word, in which, by a curious etymological freak, the memory of Mr. E]LBRIDGE GERRY, one
time Governor of Massachusetts,
is most unjustly held up to the contempt of posterity, embalmed as
neatly and as imperishably as a fly
in amber, has been the theme of
much discussion of late in the
courts of several of the United
States. The evil which it names
has become so pronounced and
,prevalent that, as one judge has
very tersely said, it is high time to
put a stop to it. The only question
is, Have the courts the necessary
power?
It has been very strenuously
urged that the judiciary has no
power to review the acts of the
legislature in apportioning its own
members, that being a matter peculiarly within its own powers, and
being a political, not a legislative
act. This question, however, may
be regarded as finally set at rest by
the able arguments of ORTON, J.,
in the first Wisconsin Gerrymander
Case, 81 Wis., 44o; s. c. 5i N. W.
Rep., 724, where he shows conclusively that not only have the
courts themselves almost uniformly
asserted this right, but that the
legislatures of several States have
sanctioned this assertion by requesting the opinion of the justices on
matters relating to apportionment:
See State v. Dudley, Ohio St, 437;
State v. Newark, 4o N.J. L., 297;
State v. Van Duyne (Neb.), 39 N.
W. Rep., 612; Opinions of Justices,

3 Me., 477; 18 Me., 458; 43 Me.,
587; 7 Mass., 523; 15 Mass., 537; 3
Pick. (Mass.), 517; 23 Pick., 547; 6
Cush. (Mass;), 575; io Gray (Mass.),
613; 142 Mass., 6oi; s. c. 7 N. B.
Rep., 35; and of CASSODAY, J., in
the Sec8nd Wisconsin Gerrymander Case, State ex rel. Lamb v.
Cunningham, Secretary of State,
53 N. W. Rep., 35; as well as by
the assumption of that fact in the
cases hereafter cited. The dictum
of the Court in Wise v. Bigger, 79
Va., 269, that laying off and defining Congressional districts is the
exercise of a political and discretionary power, for which the legislature is amenable to the people,
and that in 18 Me., 460, where the
Court held that "if such power
should be abused in any case, the
remedy is with the people. Those
guilty of any such outrage will be
likely to become in time the victims of their own misconduct. In
popular governments this, and the
right which it may be believed the
people will exercise of displacing
bad servants, are great checks upon
the abuse of power;" cannot prevail against such a weight of authority. And it is well that they
do not represent the current of judicial opinion; for while they, especially the latter, evince a praiseworthy confidence in the readiness
of the people to rebuke the misuse
of legislative power, they also exhibit a peculiar blindness to the
actual course of human events.
"It is a condition, not a theory,"
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that confronts the Court that has far are they reviewable
? Naturally,
to deal with this question of gerry- whenever and to whatever degree
mandering. Both the object and they overstep the limits set
by the
the natural tendency of a gerryConstitution. Here another effort
mander, as is well pointed out by
has been made to nullify the power
Chief Justice MORSE in Giddings
of the judiciary in this regard by
v. Blacker (Mich.), 52 N. W. Rep.,
claiming that the provisions of the
944, is to perpetuate the control of Constitution in reference to apporthe government in the hands of a
tionments are directory, and not
political party, even against the mandatory. But the general current
wishes, protests and votes of a ma- of authority is in favor of treating
jority of the people; and there are all constitutional provisions as
very few complaints made against
mandatory: Peo. v. Lawrence, 36
it by the most upright men of that Barb. (N. Y.), 177; Cooley, Const.
party. Objections to it come from
Lim., 2d Ed., i8I. The claim that
the party so kept out of power. the constitutional provisions in reIt has even been gravely urged as
gard to apportionment are directory
a reason for upholding a gerryman- seems to be especially without founder, that the complaint against it
dation. Judge ORTON, in the first
was a political action, coming from
Wisconsin Gerrymander Case, State
the opposite party.
ex rel. Attorney General v. CunEven when in the course of time, ningham, 81 Wis., 440; S. C., 51 N.
the quondam cause of right tri- W. Rep., 724, disposes of it very
umphs, and the gerrymandering
briefly.
"That most dangerous
crew are ousted from their place of doctrine, that these and other repower, the mischief does not cease.
strictions upon the power of the
No man ever saw a pendulum drawn
legislature are merely declaratory,
back to the end of its beat, and and not mandatory, should not be
then released, stop of its own ac- encouraged, even to the extent of
cord in the middle of its oscilla- discussing the question. The
contion. It swings straight to the vention, in making
a constitution,
other extreme. And, likewise, the had a higher duty
to perform than
first act of a party just coming into to give the legislature advice;"
and
power is usually to rearrange the Judge PiNNEY,
with delicate satire,
election districts so as to perpetuate remarks in the same case:
"It does
its hold upon the government. This not appear that the language
used
has apparently been the case in
(in the debates of the convention)
every State of the Union in which
was employed by way of exhortagerrymandering has been rife, and tion to the
legislature to eschew
furnishes the strongest possible rea- the pernicious
method ofgerrymanson why the courts should exercise dering then recognized as
an evil to
a power which the individual, or
be greatly deplored. It better suits
his aggregate, the people, has no
the important character of the
desire to exert,, until he gets the rights sought
to be guarded, and
shoe on the other foot, and finds
the character and purpose of the
that it pinches.
instrument, to regard these provisIt being settled, then, that the ions as mandatory,
and not direccourts have the power to review tory merely."
such acts, the next question is, how
It has also been claimed that al-
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though a transgression of a positive
mandate of the Constitution is reviewable, yet the exercise of a discretionary power is not: Peo. ex rel.
Carter v. Rice, supra; Peo. ex rel.
Baird v. Broome, 2o N. Y. Suppl.,
470. This rests upon a mistake,
however. There is no such thing
as an absolute, uncontrolled, unreviewable discretion vested in any
man, or any body of men, under a
All
constitutional government.
delegated powers must of necessity
have limits; and if there be none
expressed, there is always the implied qualification, that the powers
granted be not abused. Even in
affirming Peo. v. Rice, the Court of
Appeals took care to say: "We do
not intimate that in no case could
the action of the legislature be reviewed by the courts: Cases may
easily be imagined where the action
of that body would be so gross a
violation of the Constitution that
it could be seen that it had been
entirely lost sight of, and an intentional disregard of its commands,
both in the letter and in the spirit,
had been indulged in:" 31 N. .
Rep., on p. 929.
When the mandate of the Constitution is direct and positive, there
is no room for discretion, and any
transgression of it will render the
Act unconstitutional. When the
Constitution provides that the apportionment and districts so made
shall remain unaltered until another enumeration of the population, the boundaries of the districts
cannot be changed, either directly
or as an incident of the alteration
of town or city lines: Peo. v. Holihan, 29 Mich., I6; Kinney v. Syracuse, 30 Barb. (N. Y.), 349. A legislature cannot apportion a greater
number of representatives than is
allowed by the Constitution: State

v. Francis, 26 Kans.,

And
724.
when the Constitution prohibits
the division of a country or district,
any apportionment which violates
that prohibition is unconstitutional
and void: State ex rel., AttorneyGeneral v. Cunningham, Secretary
of State, 81 Wis., 440; S. C., 51 N.
W. Rep., 724. "Under negative
and prohibitory constitutional provisions, the Legislature may often
refrain from doing things which
are not prohibited, but it can never
do what is prohibited:" State v.
Francis, supra.
When the Legislature is vested
with discretion, its Acts are valid,
so long as that discretion is not
abused; and the courts will not investigate too closely, nor set the
brand of unconstitutionality upon
what may have been a mere error
ofjudgment. "For the wisdom or
unwisdom of what they have done
within the limits'of the powers conferred, they are answerable to the
electors of the State, and no one
else:" State v. Campbell (Ohio),
27 N. R. Rep., 884. It therefore
becomes necessary to determine
what those limits are, or, rather, to
decide how far the Legislature may
go without so far overstepping them
as to warrant judicial interference.
A degree of discretion is obviously
conferred by those constitutional
provisions which require that the
apportionment shall be according
to the number of inhabitants, or
that the districts shall be, as nearly
as may be, equal in population.
There is some difference of opinion
in respect to the latitude of this
discretion; but it is acknowledged
on all sides that it is impossible to
attain mathematical exactness in
this regard: Prouty v. Stover, II
Kans., 235; State ex rel. AttorneyGeneral v. Cunningham, 8I Wis.,
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440; S. C., 5i N. W. Rep., 724;
State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham
(Wis.), 53 N. W. Rep., 35; Giddings v. Blacker (Mich.), 52 N. W.
Rep., 944; Peo. ex rel. Carter v.
Rice (N. Y.), (the principle case),
31 N. E Rep., 921.
And that all
that is really requisite is the exercise of an honest and fair discretion. If there are any glaring inequalities of population or representation, it is a sure proof that
such a discretion has not been exercised, but that the requirements
of the Constitution have been willfully and intentionally disregarded
and violated for partisan purposes;
and it will warrant a decision that
the apportionment is unconstitutional and vold, without any direct
proof of wrongful intent on the
part of the Legislature: Peo. z:
Canaday, 73 N. C., 198. "It is
proper to say that perfect exactness
in the apportionment, according to
the number of inhabitants, is
neither required nor possible. But
there should be as close an approxinmation to exactness as possible, and this is the utmost limit
for the exercise of legislative discretion. If, as in this case, there
is such a wide and bold departure
from this constitutional rule that
it cannot possibly be justified by
the exercise of any judgment or
discretion, that evinces an intention on the part of the Legislature to utterly ignore and disregard
the rule of the Constitution in order to promote some other object
than a Constitutional Apportionment, then the conclusion is inevitible that the Legislature did
not use any judgment or discretion
whatever." ORToN, J., in State v.
Cunningham, 81 Wis., 440; S. C.,
51 N. W. Rep., 724.
In the case just cited the ratio of
55

representation was 51,117 for each
senate district, and 16.868 for each
assembly district; but the apportionment made one senate district
68,ooo, and another 38,ooo; one assembly district 38,oco, and another
7,ooo. This, in the language of
Judge ORTON, was "a direct and
palpable violation of the Constitution." As soon as this decision
was rendered, the legislature made
haste to pass another Act, which
avoided the dismembering of assembly districts, another of the
blemishes of the former Act, but
made the discrepancy in population
in some of the districts even greater
than before; e.g., 30,732 in one,
and 65.952 in another. This also
was held to be a violation of the
Constitution in State, ex rel. Lamb
v. Cunningham, 53 N. V. Rep., 35.
A very similar state of affairs
prevailed in Giddings v. Blacker
(Mich.) 52 g. W. Rep., 944. There
nine counties, with an aggregate
population

of

97,ooo, had

been

united into one district, and eight
other counties, contiguous thereto,
into another district, with a population of but 40,00, the ratio of

representation being 65,ooo; eight
districts, with but 349,056 population, had been given the same
representation as 695,717 in eight
others; and the Democrats, with a
majority 'of less than 5,000 in a
total vote of about 4oo,ooo, had

control of twenty-one senatorial
districts to the Republicans' eleven,
thus making it clear that the apportionment was only a political
device, to even up matters with the
latter, who for their part had previously so apportioned the State,
in j885, as to control twenty-one
senatorial districts to eleven, and
had given eight counties with 316,578 population the same represen-
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tation as eight others, whose aggregate was 532,222. It is no wonder
that the Court declared that a
" constitutional discretion was not
exercised in the Apportionment Act
of i891. The facts themselves
demonstrate this beyond any controversy, and no language can
make the demonstration plainer."
The same conclusion was arrived
at in Peo. v. Cauaday, 73 N. C.,
198, where the city of Wilmington
had been divided into three wards,
with equal representation;. but the
first and second wards each contained about 4,000 vote, the third
about 2,8oo. These discrepancies
are hardly more strongly marked
than some of those in the principal
case, as for example, that of 135,418 between the twelfth and thirteenth senatorial districts; and this
fact, in view of the otherwise uniform current of authority, would
tend to throw grave doubt upon
the correctness of the decision there
given, were it not for the claim in
the opinion that the figures of
population given here and in the
prefixed statement, though found
in the opinion of Judge RuMsnx
at special term (19 N. Y. Suppl.,
978), were not properly before the
Court, and so could have no influence upon its decision. But this is
not a valid excuse; for courts take
judicial notice of the pophlation of
cities and towns according to the
:authorized census reports: Hawkins v. Thomas (Ind.) 29 N. E.
Rep., 157; Bank v. Cheney, 94 Ill.,
.430; Peo. v. Williams, 64 Cal., 87;
,S. C., 27 Pac. Rep., 939; Peo. v.
W ang Wang (Cal.) 28 Pac. Rep.,
o
27 , and of the local divisions of a
county or State: Linck v. City of
Litchfield (Ill.) 31 N. E. Rep., 123;
State v. Powers, 25 Conn., 48;
Goodwin v. Appleton, 22 Me., 453;

Winnipiscogee Lake Co. v. Young,
40 N., H., 420. Such a claim is
rendered especially peculiar in this
case by the fact that the sdme
opinion urges as a fact to be considered in upholding the validity
of the apportionment of assemblymen, that three of the'counties improperly preferred showed large
gains of population, according to
the census. If it could be referred
to for one purpose, why not for the
other?
It may be regarded, then, as settled beyond a doubt, that an apportionment act will be declared uncontitutional if there is any manifest abuse of the limited discretion
reposed in the legislature by the
Constitution; but there is some"
difference of opinion as to what
constitutes such, an abuse. In the
cases cited from North Carolina,
Michigan and Wisconsin, and in
the principal case also, if we are
permitted to look at the figures,
which it is contended we have a
perfect right to do, the abuse of
discretion is so glaring as to leave
no room for question, unless an exceedingly liberal and unwarrantable construction is put upon the
words " as nearly as may be." Yet
it was in this very manner that,
after indulging in a curious and
rather incomprehensible arithmetical juggle, the Cturt in the principal case disposed of the second objection to the validity of the act,
that based upon the failure of the
legislature to apportion the extra
members of the Assembly in strict
order to the counties having the
largest surplus over the unit of representation. The constitutional requirement, that the apportionment
of members of Assembly among
the several counties should be, "as
nearly as may be, according to the
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number of their respective inhabitants," was boldly construed out of
the way by the lower Court in Peo.
ex iel. Carter v. Rice, 2o N. Y.
SuppI., 293, with serene disregard
of the canon of construction, that
words shall be understood to have
their ordinary signification, by
holding, as nearly as can be ascertained from the argument, that
these words do not mean as nearly
as possible, or practicable, but as
nearly as the legislature may think
proper. The case cited in support
of this view, of conformity of procedure in Federal courts to that in
State courts, has no real analogy.
A mere matter of procedure, and
one of substantive right, are wholly
different in their nature, and a degree of discretion may well be allowed in the former that would be
ruinous in the latter. The Court
of Appeals did not adopt this reasoning, but declared the words to
be "a direction addressed to the
legislature in the way of a general
statement of the principles upon
which the apportionment shall be
made."
But Judge AxnREWS, in
his dissenting opinion, concurred in
by Judge FiNCi, clearly points out
the fallacies and dangers of such a
doctrine. "The argument urged
upon us that the words 'as nearly
as may be ' give a discretion to the
legislature, if it means anything as
applied to the circumstances of this
case, means that the legislature
may disregard the plain meaning
and mandate of the Constitution.
When the Court can see
that the rule of the Constitution
was not in fact applied, and the
circumstances for its application
were clear and unequivocal, then
there is nothing left to the Court
but to declare the apportionment

void. The suggestion that the circumstances under which legislatures act in such matters give
opportunity for the play of passion
and prejudice, and therefore this
must be considered in determining
the validity of an apportionment
act, seems to me to have no place
in this discussion. The very object
of constitutional restrictions is to
establish a rule of conduct which
cannot be varied according to the
passion or caprice of a majority,
and to fix an immutable standard
applicable under all circumstances.
If a departure from the fundamental law by legislatures can in one
case be justified by the frailties of
human nature, and the constitutionality of an act, may be made to
depend in one case upon such aconsideration, the constitutionality
of all legislation may be governed
by the same rule. I have said the
very object in imposing restraints
in the Constitution is to protect
great principles and interests
against the operation of such eccentric and disturbing forces. The
discretion of the legislature, if any,
in apportioning members ends
where certainty begins, and that
point was reached when the counties-having the largest remainders
were ascertained."
The full effects of the decision of
the majority of the Court is best
seen in looking at the facts of the
case as they appear in the prefixed
statement. Here one county, with
181,230 population, has three metnbers, while another county, with a
population of nearly i5,ooo less,
has four; one with 75,078 has two,
while another, with 5,000 more, has
but one. It needs a deal of argument to prove this a just and legal
exercise of discretion.
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This very point arose in Board
of Supervisors of Houghton Co. v.
Blacker (Mich.) 52N. W. Rep., 951,
and was there thus tersely disposed
of: "There can be no legal discretion, under the Constitution, to
give a county of less population
than another a greater representation. Such action would be arbitrary and capricious, and against
the vital principle of equality in
our government, and it is not intended or permitted by the Constitution; nor could such action
lead ,to any good result. There
can be found no excuse for it." It
is to be feared, therefore, that while
the majority opinion in the principal case asserts the validity of
the new apportionment act of 1892,
it fails to prove it.
The Court itself seems to have
felt the inherent weakness of the
arguments upon which it relies, for
it introduces a number of extraneous considerations to prove the
wisdom of its decision.
Chief
ambng these are the dire consequences which would flow from a
decision against the constitutionality of the act, compelling a declaration that the preceding apportionment act was invalid, and thus
throwing the elections back upon
an act more than a quarter of a
century old. But, as Judge ANDREWS says, "The attempt to
justify the apportionment of 1892
by the fact asserted (which seems
to be true) that the apportionment
of 1879 was subject to as great or
greater objection on the score of
inequality than the later act, fails
because the fact is irrelevant. It
is one thing that a legislature has
disregarded its duty on a former
occasion, and that the people have
acquiesced in the usurpation, and
quite a different and a much more

serious thing if such a disregard of
constitutional limitation should receive judicial sanction."
Two
wrongs never made a right. The
Court has no business to concern
itself with consequences, when the
path of duty is clear. It is in no
way responsible for them.
The
Supreme Court of Michigan in a
similar dilemma boldly asserted
both acts to be "tarred with the
same stick," and set both aside;
and Chief Justice MORSE emphatically declared, "The consequences
of this decision are not for us. It
is our duty to declare thb law, to
point out the invasion of the Constitution and to forbid it:" Giddings v. Blacker, sufira, p. 948.
This same argument ab inconvenienti was presented in a somewhat different form by Judge
WINSLOW in a dissenting opinion
in State, ex rel.Lamb v. Cunningham (Wis.) 53 N. W. Rep., p. 59,
where he urges that a decision
against the act would brand every
legislature since 1852 as de facto
merely, inasmuch as every prior
apportionment act had contained
greater discrepancies; but it is hard
to see the exact force of this, since
the acts of a defacto legislature are
valid, on grounds of public policy:
ORTON, J., in State v. Cunningham,
51 N. W. Rep., on p. 729. See also
Auditor General v. Board of Supervisors (Mich.) 51 N. W. Rep., 490491.
He also lays much stress
upon contemporaneous construction, shown by these same apportionments (which, however, would
be all the stronger reason for putting a stop to the thing before it
went any farther); but the strongest
ground of objection that he adduces
is the danger that the courts, by
continued adverse decisions, may
at last substitute their apportion-
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ment for that of the legislature.
At present, however, there seems
to be but little cause for apprehension on this score, and it will be
time enough to consider it when
the evil becomes pressing.
The validity of an Apportionment Act maybe called in question
by either quo warranto (Peo. v.
Canady, 73 N. C., 198), mandamus
(Peo. v. R.ice, 31 N. E. Rep., 921),
or injunction (State ex rel. Att.Gen. v. Cunningham (Wis.), 51
N. W. Rep., 724; S. C., 81 Wis.,
44o). The proper mode of procedure is, of course, at the relation of
the attorney-general; but if that
officer refuses to act, then either
mandamus or injunction may be
brought at the relation of a private
citizen; for otherwise such a refusal would prevent the people
from obtaining redress for such an
infringement upon their rights and
liberties : Giddings v. Blacker
(Mich.). 52 N. W. Rep., 944;
State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham (Wis.), 5 3 N. W. Rep., 35. In

COMMONWEALTH

v.

any case, however, the suit must
be brought against an officer who
is entrusted with duties in relation
to the matter that are purely ministerial. There can be no direct
judicial remedy, as against an unconstitutional apportionment, even
by and through the extraordinary
jurisdiction of the Court, unless the
controversy can be made in some
form with and against some officer
whose duties are ministerial, and
who is therefore amenable to the
coercive power of the Court tp compel execution of its judgment or
decree. If the respondent is not,
as to the matter in hand, a mere
ministerial officer, owing mere ministerial duties, if he is vested with
political or discretionary power subject to no limitation, the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be maintained; for the Court will not render a judgment or decree that it
has no possible right to enforce."
PIN=Y, J., in State v. Cunningham (Wis.), 51 N. W. Rep., p. 735R. D. S.

TIERNEY.

SUPREME COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA. 1
SYLLABUS.
Liquor License Law -Social Clubs-Device to Evade the License Law.
A wholesale liquor dealer whose license had been withheld, was in'dicted soon after for selling liquor in the same old bar-room without a
license. His defence was that he was not selling on his own account
but as steward of the Ellsworth Club, and that no sales were made to any
but members of the club unless brought there by members. The club
room was only a space of about six feet square, partitioned off from the
old bar-room, although over one hundred members were claimed. The
building was owned by the defendant, who lived there with his family.
All liquors, it was alleged, belonged to the club, merely being dispensed
by the defendant as steward. Each member had a key to the club room
and paid an initiation fee of twenty-five cents and ten cents as weekly
24 AtI. Rep., 64; i Adv. (Leg. Int.), 584.

See Editorial Notes (Infra).
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dues: The main object of the club was sociability, and to some extent
mental improvement. Its literary department consisted of two daily
newspapers and the Police Gazelle. The members paid the regular retail
price for their drinks.
It was held that though it was a club in form, it was in fact a mere
sham or device to evade the license laws; a mere bar-room where liquors
were sold without a license. "There was a clumsy attempt to disguise
its real character and throw over it the protecting mantle of the law. The
latter is not so feeble, however, that it cannot pierce such a thin covering as this. . . . The rights of a bona.Ade club are not involved and
we prefer to decide only what is legitimately and necessarily before us.
Were we to countenance such a sham as this, any man who is
refused a license can get a few of his customers to sign a paper constituting themselves a club, rent them his old bar-room, have himself appointed
a steward, and by such clumsy device evade the law. We cannot dignify such an association by treating it as a club."
Opinion by PAxsON, C. J.
SOCIAL CLUBS AND
It is needless to state that clubs
are becoming an increasingly important element in modern social life, and that they exist generally throughout the country.
Their usual purpose is to provide
for the social and intellectual entertainment of their members, and
they are chiefly supported and
maintained by the fees, dues and
assessments required of their members. The transaction of business
for profit is rarely, if ever, contemplated. Intoxicating liquors are in
many cases bought by clubs and
furnished to their members only, at
a price fixed by club regulations.
The money received in this way is
used for maintaining the supply of
liquors and paying the cost of their
keep and service, and the other expenses of the club. The question
of whether or not this method of
furnishing intoxicating liquors by
a club to its members constitutes a
sale within the meaning of a law
that requires a license before one
can engage in the retailing of such
liquor, or whether it constitutes a
sale within the meaning of statutes
prohibit;ng all sales of intoxicating
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liquor whatever, has led to many
and conflicting decisions. The principal case suggests a natural division
of the subject, and for convenience
of treatment the decisions will,
therefore, be discussed under two
heads: first, as they affect clubs
formed with the view of evading
the requirements or prohibition of
liquor laws; and, second, as they
affect bonafide clubs.
(a) A s to Clubs Formedto Evade
the Liquor Laws.-As to these all
authorities agree that the courts
will not tolerate any attempt whatever to evade the liquor laus by
clubs formed for that purpose. The
mere formation of a club, whether
by way of association or incorporation, will not protect a vendor of
liquors from the penalties imposed
for selling without a license where
the real and transparent character
of the transaction, and so understood by the participants, is nothing but the device ofan individual to
sell liquor without a license and for
personal profit. One inquiry must
always be whether the organization is bonafide,a club with limited
and selected membership, and in
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which the 'pioperty is actually
owned in common with the rights of
comilion ownership under the rules
of the club, or whether the form of
the club has been adopted for other
purposes, with the ounderstanding
that the mutual'rights 'and obligations of the members shall not be
while the substanciof what is done
such as the organization purports to
create. ":By the evasion of the law
mentioned, is intended an evasion
by means of a form or device, which
is 'apparently legal, is within the
prohibition of the statute:" Com.
v. Pomphret, 137 Mass., 567.
Such a scheme is presented by
the case of State v. Tindall, 4o Mo.
App., 271, where the make-up of
a dub-room was, in all respects,
similar to an ordinary bar-room,
and the dram-seeker, by signing
articles of association and paying
an admission of twenty-five cents,
could obtain liquors at the ordinary
retail rates from the defendant,
who apparently had complete control. It was held to be "such a
palpable scheme that the defence
was devoid of any merit."
The case of Richart v. People, 79
Ill., 85, has been decided to be another example of an attempted
evasion.' Here, an association, styling itself the "WVheaton Co-Partnership Company No. One," apparently bought out the dram-shop
of one of its members, who continued in possession as treasurer of
the association. Any person could
become a member by purchasing
from the treasurer a "Certificate
of Co-partnership Investment in
the Wheaton Co-Partnership Company No. One," at a cost of one
dollar. The certificate was stamped
with numbers from one to twenty,
and presentation thereof to the
treasurer, entitled the holder to

liquors or cigars, which were really
paid for at the ordinary prices by
having the certificates punched at
the rate of five cents a number. All
purchases and sales were made by
the treasurer, who never accounted
for, nor was it ever intended that
he should account for, the money.
Other specimens of so-called
"clubs" that have been treated as
mere attempts to evade the liquor
laws, are found in the principle
case'of Comm. v. Tierney, 24 Atl.
Rep., 64, and the cases of State v.
Mercer, 32 Ia., 4o5, and Comm. v.
Ewig, 145 Mass., 119.
The question of whether any
given club is bonla fide, or an attempted evasion is a matter of fact,
and the court has no right to rule,
as matter of law, that any such arrangement as the facts may show,
was an evasion of the law. It is a
question for the jury upon all the
facts and under appropriate instructidn: Com. v. Smith, 102 Mass.,
144; Com. v. Ewing, 145 Mass.,
ii9; Rickart v. People, 79 Ill., 85;
Mavemont v. State, 48 Ind., 21.
(b) As to Bona Fide Clubs.-It
has recently been said that it would
be difficult to find another subject
of equal importance and novelty
concerning which so large a number of decided cases had left the
law in so chaotic .condition. An
examination of the cases justifies
the assertion. It is impossible to
reconcile them either by a comparison of the wording or object of
statutes or the interpretation of
words, and, therefore, they will be
grouped according as they do or do
not favor the freedom of the clubs.
r. Cases ufholding the right of
bonafide clubs to distributeintoxicatingliquoramongits;nembersfor
money without a license, notwithstandingthe license laws.
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This conclusion has been reached
by the various cases in two different ways: first, by a technical interpretation of the meaning of the
word "sale" employed in license
and prohibition acts, and holding
it inapplicable to the method of
distribution of refreshments used
in clubs, and the second, by a liberal interpretation of the whole
statute involved, deciding from
its spirit and intent, as shown by
its general provisions, that it was
not intended to apply to the business of selling liquor to the public
for profit.
(a) Freedom of clubs from the
liquor laws through technical interpretation of the word "sale."
A sale is defined io be a transfer of
the absolute or general property in
a thing for a price in money (I
Benj. on Sales, i). It is therefore
argued that the furnishing by a
club of liquors purchased with the
money raised from fees and dues
of members is not a sale within the
meauing of the License Acts, but
an equitable arrangement for the
distribution of property among coowners, which each member has a
right to enforce by reason of the
club's rules and regulations. In
other words, some courts maintain
that the requirement of the payment of money for liquor used by
members is only a recognition of
the fact that the tastes and needs of
individuals in this respect differ so
greatly that the only method of
levying an equitable assessment to
maintain the supply of refreshments is by requiring the members
to pay a sum fixed by the amount
of liquor actually used by the individual. This result is somewhat affected by the method of
formation of a club, whether it
is an association or a corporation.

The first case that arose where
the club was an association, as well
as the first case upon the subject in
general, was Com. v. Smith, 102
Mass., 144 (1869). The defendant
was indicted under a statute treating as a public nuisance the keeping of any place whefe liquor was
sold without a license. A number
of persons composing an unincorporated club advanced a certain
sum of money each, thus creating
a common fund. The defendant
being appointed agent of the club,
purchased liquors and other refreshments with the money thus raised,
and then distributed checks at the
rate of five cents each to the members in proportion to the amount
advanced by each. Upon presentation of the checks the defendint
would deliver to the holder liquor
of corresponding amount. The
jury having found that the transaction was .bona fide, As,
J., said:
"It certainly has happened, and
not infrequently, that a number of
persons unite in importing wines
or other liquors from a foreign
country to be dividedbetween them
according to some fixed proportion.
Certainly the person who should
receive them and superintend the
division among the contributors in
proportion to the purchase money
is not a seller of liquors. If the
liquors really belonged to the members of the club and had been previously purchased by them, or on
their account, ofsomeperson other
than the defendant, and if he merely
kept the liquors for them and to be
divided among them according to
a previously arranged plan, there
would be neither a selling nor a
keeping for sale."
The case which is usually quoted
as the leading authority for this
doctrine is Graff v. ]-'vans, L. Rt
Q. B. D., 373. There the manager
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of the Grosvenor Club, a bonafide
association, was prosecuted for selling without a license, contrary to
the English Licensing Act of 1872,
which provides that " No person,
shall sell or expose for sale, by retail, any intoxicating liquor without being duly licensed to sell the
same." Liquors and otherrefreshments were bought with the funds
of the club and distributed by the
defendant to the members for consumption, at fixed. rates, the proceeds going to the general funds of
the club.
In deciding the case
FiELD,- J., said: "The
question
here is, did Graff, the manager who
supplied the liquors to Foster,
effect a sale by retail? I think not.
I ihink Foster was an owner of the
property together with all theother members of the club. Any
member was entitled to obtain the
goods on payment of the price. A
sale involves the element of a bargain. There was no bargain here
nor any contract with Graff with
respect to the goods. Foster was
acting upon his right as a member
of the club, not by reason of any
new contract, but under his old
contract of association, by which
he subscribed a sum to the funds
of the club and became entitled to
have ale and whiskey supplied to
him as a member at a certain price.
I cannot conceive it possible that
Graff could have. sued him for the
price as the price of goods sold and
delivered. There was no contract
between two persons, because Foster was vendor as well as buyer.
Taking the transaction to be a purchase by Foster of all the other
members' shares in the goods, Foster was as much a co-owner as the
vendor. I think it was a transfer
of a special property, which was
not a sale within the meaning of

.

the section." See also Com. v.
Pomphret, 137 Mass., 564.
Even where the clubs have been
incorporated, the same theory that
the, regulations of the club amount
substantially to a method of dividing the property among co-owners
subject to an account, has been
applied - Seim v. State, 53 Md.,
566 (i88o); Newell v. Hemingway,
I6 Cox C. C., 6o4 (1888); State v.
McMaster, 14 S. E. R., 270 (1891).
The only reference to the difference
of formation which it would seem
should have at least some bearing
upon the original ownership of supplies appears in Seim v. State,
supra, where it says, "The society
is not an ordinary incorporation,:
but a voluntary association' or club
intended for social purposes, and
that as the meniber8 have a right to
secure'liquor under the regulations
of the club, it is not a sale by way oftrade which is taken to be the meaning of the word in the Act.
(b)Freedom of clubs from the provisions of license -laws through a
liberal interpretation of the whole
II
statute,.
Here it is maintained -that the
object of license laws is not to
forbid the drinking of liquors, but
to regulate the sale subject to
penalties. The legislature has the
power to prohibit as well as to
license. Its control of the subject
is complete, and therefore it is its
duty to clearly describe the subjects to which the penalties may be
applied.- These subjects are to be
ascertained from the statute taken
as a whole, from its intent and
spirit, as shown by its omissions, as
well as its provisions, and from a
due regard to the old law, the mischief and the, present remedy.
Thus in Barden v. Montana Club,
io Montana, 330, the provision

-
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of the license law that "All
persons who sell directly or indirectly any spirituous, alcoholic,
vinous or malt liquors shall, before
the transaction of such business,
obtain a license," etc., was very
similar as to the subjects to which
it was to apply to another portion
of the license laws providing for
the payment of a certain sum by
"anyperson or personswho shall
keep any house or saloon or room
where any game of chance is dealt
And
in or played for money."
since afterwards the legislature had
amended the latter to read, "Any
person or persons, or association of
persons, who shall keep any house
or saloon or room 'or dub-room
where any game of chance is dealt
in or played for money," itwas
held, as there was no room for
construing the Act relating to
gambling games, that "where
these distinctions are so carefully
preserved, it is a reasonable inference that the legislature did not
designate the business of the appellant in framing the law defining
licenses." Likewise in Tennessee
Club v. Dwyer, ii Lea, 452 (1883)
and Piedmont .Club v. Com., 87
the respective
Va., 340 (891),
license laws of these two States
were held upon a review of their
various provisions to be intended
only to require licenses from those
persons who engaged in the business (as other merchants) of sell-.
ing liquor to the public with a view
to personal profit.
2. Cases requiring dubs to be
licensed--On the other hand it has
been settled in even a greater number ofjurisdictions that the distribution by a club to members, of liquors
for money, has every element of a
sale, and that, therefore, they cannot
sell without a license under license

laws, nor at all under prohibition
laws.
The license laws, they say, indicate no purpose or intention of
enabling every person, natural or
artificial, to obtain a license, and,
therefore, the incapacity to receive
a license does not exonerate the
seller from the penalty of selling
without a license.
It is maintained with force that
mere good faith cannot grant extra
privileges, that there are certain
crimes which do not depend upon
the intention of the offender and
are not otbe distinguished from simple torts, except by the fact that in
the one case an individual sues for
damages resulting from the private
tort, while in the other the State
prosecutes for the penalty fixed for
the public wrong. In these cases
the offence consists in the act done,
without regard to the intention
with which it is committed. There
is no difficulty in, attributing to a
corporation an offence of this character since it may be committed by
the company's agent or servant
employed for the purpose.
The whole basis of these divisions
is that the distribution of liquor by
a club to its members for money is
a sale within the meaning of the
acts, and, therefore, subject to their
provisions. As before, the reasons
vary somewhat with the nature of
the formation, whether an association or corporation.'
As to associations, the first case,
U. S. v. Wittig, 2 Law, 466, arose
under an attempt to subject a bona
fide club to the U. S. revenue tax
upon retail liquor dealers. "There
seems to me," said Judge LownLL,
"to be no doubt that the club sells
the liquor to its members. Fvery
element of sale is present, the delivery of the beer on the one part,
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and the payment on the other. It
was argued that at common law a
man cannot buy of himself and
others. This is a mistake. The
common law recognizes such a sale,
though if the contract is executory,
the common law has no mode of
enforcing it."
In State v. Neiss, xo8 N. C., 787,
the steward of the Cosmopolitan
Club, an institution of high social
standing, was indicted for selling
liquor in violation of a local option
prohibition statute. The liquor was
purchased with money taken from
a common fund created by the
members treating themselves as
unorganized, and were distributed
to members at cost. "When in
the present case," said CLARK, J.,
"an individual received drinks for
himself and friends, he clearly did
not receive the identical liquor
which belonged to himself, but he
received liquor which belonged
mostly to others, and in which he
had a minute undivided interest.
Before the transaction the money
was solely his and the liquor belonged to several. By virtue of the
transaction and in exchange for the
money the liquor became his sole
and separate property. This is
surely a sale. It has every element
of a sale. . . . The dealing
here is simply wvhat is known as
' co-operation,' which is an arrangement by which a member of an association procures for an association
at cost. The object and the effect
of co-operation is not to abolish
purchases, for the members still
buy from the association, but to
procure supplies at cost. This
transaction is necessarily either a
partition in severalty to the tenant
in common or a purchase. It is
clearly not a partition to each
tenant in common of his undivided portion in the common

stock, and it is plain that such is
not the purpose and intent of the
parties, for money is received in
exchange, and it is to be used to
obtain more liquor." Also Negalea
v. State, io So. R. Miss., 574; People
v. Andrews, 115 N. Y., 427; Marmont v. State, 48 Ind., 21.
In incorporated clubs tlhe same
result is reached by treating the
transaction as a sale by the corporation to an incorporator instead of
by a copartnership to a member of
the firm. The corporation is a legal
entity and the owners of the liquors
purchased with its money.
As
owner, through its servants, it dlivers them to the purchaser at their
call and charges a price fixed by the
corporation. The property in the
goods settles and vests in the purchaser and the money is received
for and becomes the property of
the club. A corporation can make
contracts and deal with a corporator precisely as with a stranger,
and the contracts thus formed are
valid and capable of enforcement.
The transaction is therefore a sale
of liquors and the wrongdoer is
liable to the penalties of the license
and prohibition laws: Newark v.
Essex Club, 53 N.J. L., 99;People
v. Soule, 74 Mich., 250; State v.
Lockyear, 95 N. C., 633; Chesapeake
Club v. State, 65 Md., 446; State v.
Easton Club, 73 Md., 97; Martin v.
State, 59 Ala., 34; State v. Horasek,
41 Kan., 87; People v. Bradley. ii
N. Y. Sup., 94; Kentucky Club v.
Louisville, 17 S. W. Rep:, 745.
The results of the statutes and
decisions in the States of Massachusetts and Maryland merit special attention.
It was settled as early as 1869 in
the former State by Com. v. Smith,
supra,-followed by Com. v. Pomphret, 137 Mass., 564,COm. 1. Ewig
145 Mass., Ii9, and Com. v. Geary

